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Abstract. Position verification in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is
quite tricky in presence of attackers (malicious sensor nodes), who try
to break the verification protocol by reporting their incorrect positions
(locations) during the verification stage. In the literature of WSNs, most
of the existing methods of position verification have used trusted veri-
fiers, which are in fact vulnerable to attacks by malicious nodes. They
also depend on some distance estimation techniques, which are not ac-
curate in noisy channels (mediums). In this article, we propose a secure
position verification scheme for WSNs in noisy channels without relying
on any trusted entities. Our verification scheme detects and filters out
all malicious nodes from the network with a very high probability.
Key words: Central limit theorems, Distributed protocol, Quantiles,
Location verification, Security, Wireless networks.
1 Introduction
Secure position verification is important for wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
because position of a sensor node is a critical input for many WSN applications
those include tracking [11], monitoring [22] and geometry based routing [15].
Most of the existing position verification protocols rely on distance estimation
techniques such as received signal strength (RSS)[1, 12], time of flight (ToF)[10]
and time difference of arrival (TDoA)[19]. These techniques are relatively easy to
implement, but they are a little bit expensive due to their requirement of special
hardwares to estimate end-to-end distances. These above techniques, especially
RSS techniques [1, 12] are perfect in terms of precision in ideal situations. The
Friis transmission equation 1 [18] used in RSS techniques leads to this precision.
But, in practice, due to the presence of noise in the network channel, signal
attenuation does not necessarily follow this equation. There are many nasty
effects those have influence on both propagation time and signal strength. So, the
distance calculated using Friis equation usually differs from the actual distance.
This difference, in reality, may also depend on the location of the sender and the
receiver. A good position verification protocol should take care of these noises
and limited precisions in distance estimation.
In this article, we use the RSS technique for position verification, where the
receiving node estimates the distance of the sender on the basis of sending and
receiving signal strengths. Here we use the term node for wireless sensor device
in WSNs, which is capable of processing power and equipped with transceivers
communicating over a wireless channel. We consider that there are two types
of nodes in the system, genuine nodes and malicious nodes. While the genuine
nodes follow the implemented system functionality correctly, the malicious nodes
are under the control of an adversary. To make the verification problem most
difficult, we assume that the malicious nodes know all genuine nodes and their
positions (coordinates). Once the coordinates of all genuine nodes are known,
the main objective of a malicious node is to report a suitable faking position
to all these genuine nodes such that it can deceive as many genuine nodes as
possible. On the other hand, the objective of a genuine node is to detect the
inconsistency in the information provided by a malicious node. In order to do
this, they compare two different estimates of the distances, one calculated from
the coordinates provided by a node and the other computed using the RSS
technique. If these estimates are close, the genuine node accepts the sender as
genuine, otherwise the sender node is considered as a malicious node. Malicious
nodes, however, do not go for such calculations. They always report all genuine
nodes as malicious and all malicious nodes as genuine to break the verification
protocol. In this present work, we deal with such situations and discuss how to
detect and filter out all such malicious nodes from a WSN in a noisy channel.
Related Works: Most of the existing methods for secure position verification [4, 5,
16, 17] rely on a fixed set of trusted entities (or verifiers) and distance estimation
techniques to filter out faking (malicious) nodes. We refer to this model as the
trusted sensor (or TS ) model. In this model, faking nodes may use some modes of
attacks that cannot be adopted by genuine nodes, such as radio signal jamming
or using directional antenna that permit to implement attacks, e.g., wormhole
attack [13, 21] and Sybil attack [7]. Lazos and Poovendran [16] proposed a secure
range-independent localization scheme, which is resilient to wormhole and Sybil
attacks with high probability. Lazos et. al. [17] further refined this scheme with
multi-lateration to reduce the number of required locators, while maintaining
probabilistic guarantees. Shokri et. al. [21] proposed a secure neighbor verifica-
tion protocol, which is secure against the classic 2-end wormhole attack. These
authors assumed that there is no compromise between external adversaries and
the correct nodes or their cryptographic keys, but these adversaries control a
number of relay nodes which results in a wormhole attack. The TS model was
also considered by Capkun and Hubaux [4] and Capkun et. al. [5]. In [4], the
authors presented a protocol, which relies on the distance bounding technique
proposed by Brands and Chaum [2]. The protocol presented in [5] relies on a
set of hidden verifiers. There are two major weakness of the TS model; firstly, it
is not possible to self-organize a network in a completely distributed way, and
secondly, periodical checking is required to ensure that the trusted nodes remain
trusted. Position verification problem becomes more challenging in the case of
without providing any trusted sensor nodes prior. Delae¨t et. al.[6] considerd the
model as the no trusted sensor (or NTS ) model. Hwang et. al.[14] and Delae¨t et.
al.[6] have investigated the verification problem with the NTS model. In both
of these articles, the authors considered the problem, where the faking nodes
operate synchronously with other nodes. The approach in [14] is randomized
and consists of two phases: distance measurement and filtering. In the distance
measurement phase, all nodes measure their distances from their neighbours,
when faking nodes are allowed to corrupt the distance measure technique. In
this phase, each node announces one distance at a time in a round robin fash-
ion. Thus the message complexity is O(n2). In the filtering phase, each genuine
node randomly picks up two so-called pivot nodes and carries out its analysis
based on those pivots. However, these chosen pivot sensors could be malicious.
So, the protocol may only give a probabilistic guarantee. The approach in [6] is
deterministic and consists of two phases that can correctly filter out malicious
nodes, which are allowed to corrupt the distance measure technique. In the case
of RSS, the protocol tolerates at most ⌊n2 ⌋ − 2 faking sensors (n being the total
number of nodes in the WSN) provided no four sensors are located on the same
circle and no four sensors are co-linear. In the case of ToF, it can handle up to
⌊n2 ⌋−3 faking sensors provided no six sensors are located on the same hyperbola
and no six sensors are co-linear.
Our results: The main contribution of this article is SecureNeighborDiscov-
ery, a secure position verification protocol in the NTS model in a noisy channel.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first protocol in the NTS model in a
noisy environment. The protocol guarantees that the genuine nodes reject all
incorrect positions of malicious nodes with very high probability (almost equal
to 1) when there are sufficiently many genuine nodes in the WSN. If the noise in
the network channel is negligible, this required number of genuine nodes matches
with the findings of [6], where the authors proposed a deterministic algorithm
for detecting faking sensors. However, when the noise is not negligible, each node
can only have a limited precision for distance estimation. In such cases, it is not
possible to develop a deterministic algorithm. Our protocol based on probabilis-
tic algorithm takes care of this problem and filters out all malicious nodes from
the WSN with a very high probability. When the number of nodes in the WSN
is reasonably large, this probability turns out to be very close to 1. So, for all
practical purposes, this proposed probabilistic method behaves almost like a de-
terministic algorithm. Our SecureNeighborDiscovery protocol can be used
to prevent Sybil attack [7] by verifying whether each message contains the real
position (id) of its sender or not. The genuine nodes never accept any message
with a malicious sender location.
2 Technical preliminaries
We assume that each node knows their geographic position (coordinates) and
form complete graph for communication among themselves, i.e., each node is able
to communicate with all other nodes in the WSN. We further assume that the
WSN is partially synchronous: all nodes operate in phases. In first phase, each
node is able to send exactly one message to all other nodes without collision.
Unless mentioned otherwise, we will also assume that, for each transmission,
all nodes use the same transmission power Ss. Malicious nodes are allowed to
transmit incorrect coordinates (incorrect identifier) to all other nodes. We fur-
ther assume that malicious nodes cooperate among themselves in an omniscient
manner (i.e. without exchanging messages) in order to deceive the genuine nodes
in the WSN. Each malicious node obeys synchrony and transmits at most one
message at the beginning of first phase and one message at the end of it.
Let dij be the true distance of node i from a genuine node j. Since node j does
not know the location of node i, it estimates dij using two different techniques,
one using the RSS technique and the other using the co-ordinates provided by
node i. These two estimates are denoted by dˆij and d˜ij , respectively. In the RSS
technique, under idealized conditions, node j can precisely measure the distance
of node i using Friis transmission equation 1 [18] given by
Srji = S
s
i
(
λ
4pidij
)2
(1)
where Ssi is the transmission power of the sender node i (here S
s
i = S
s for all i),
Srji is the corresponding RSS at the receiving node j, and λ is the wave length.
If the sender node i gives perfect information regarding its location (i.e.,
d˜ij = dij), then the distance estimated using the RSS technique (dˆij) and that
computed from coordinates provided by node i (d˜ij) will be equal in the ideal
situation. However, in practice, when we have noise in the channel, they cannot
match exactly, but they are expected to be close. But, if node i sends an incorrect
information about its location, |d˜ij − dˆij | can be large.
3 RSS technique in a noisy medium
The above Friis transmission equation 1 is used in telecommunications engineer-
ing, and gives the power transmitted from one antenna to another under ideal-
ized conditions. One should note that in the presence of noise in the network, the
transmission equation may not hold, and it needs to be modified. Modifications
to this equation based on the effects of impedance mismatch, misalignment of
the antenna pointing and polarization, and absorption can be incorporated using
an additional noise factor ε, which is supposed to follow a Normal (Gaussian)
distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. The modified equation is given by
Srji = S
s
i
(
α
dij
)2
+ εij (2)
Where εij ∼ N(0, σ2) and α = λ4pi . However, the εijs are unobserved in practice.
So, the receiving node j estimates the distance dij using the Friis transmis-
sion equation 1, and this estimate is given by dˆij = α (S
s
i /S
r
ji)
1/2
. Since εij ∼
N(0, σ2), following the 3σ limit, Srji is expected to lie between S
s
i (α/dij)
2 − 3σ
and Ssi (α/dij)
2
+3σ, where dij is the unknown true distance. Accordingly, dˆij is
expected to lie in the range [dij{1+(3σd2ij/α2Ssi )}−
1
2 , dij{1−(3σd2ij/α2Ssi )}−
1
2 ].
So, if the sender sends its genuine coordinates (i.e., d˜ij = dij), dˆij is expected
to lie in the range [d˜ij{1 + (3σd˜2ij/α2Ssi )}−
1
2 , d˜ij{1− (3σd˜2ij/α2Ssi )}−
1
2 ] with
probability almost equal to 1 (≃ 0.9973). The receiver node j accepts node i as
genuine when dˆij lies in that range. Throughout this article, we will assume σ
2
to be known. However, if it is unknown, one can estimate it by sending signals
from known distances and measuring the deviations in received signal strengths
from those expected in ideal situations. Looking at the distribution of these de-
viations, one can also check whether the error distribution is really normal (see
[20] for the test of normality of error distributions). If it differs from normality,
one can choose a suitable model for the error distribution and find the accep-
tance interval using the quantiles of that distribution. For the sake of simplicity,
throughout this article, we will assume the error distribution to be normal, which
is the most common and popular choice in the statistics literature.
We assume that there are n sensor nodes deployed over a region D in a two
dimensional plane, n0 of them are genuine, and the rest n1 (n0 + n1 = n) are
malicious. Though our protocol does need n0 and n1 to be specified, for the better
understanding of the reader, we will use these two terms for the description and
mathematical analysis of our protocol.
3.1 Optimal strategy for malicious sensor nodes
Here, we deal with the situation, where all malicious nodes know all genuine
nodes and their positions, or in other words, they know which of the sensor nodes
are genuine and which ones are malicious. Therefore, to break the verification
protocol, each malicious node reports all genuine nodes as malicious and all
malicious nodes as genuine. In addition to that, a malicious node tries to report a
suitable faking position so that it can deceive as many genuine nodes as possible.
Let xj = (xj , yj) j = 1, 2, . . . , n0, be the coordinates of the genuine nodes and
x0 = (x0, y0) be the true location of a malicious node. Instead of reporting its
original position, the malicious node looks for a suitable faking position xf =
(xf , yf) to deceive the genuine nodes. Note that if it sends xf as its location,
from that given coordinates, the j-th (j = 1, 2 . . . , n0) genuine node estimates
its distance by d˜0j = ‖xj−xf‖, where ‖ ·‖ denotes the usual Euclidean distance.
Again, the distance estimated from the received signal is dˆ0j = α (S
s
0/S
r
j0)
1/2.
So, the j-th node accepts the malicious node as genuine if dˆ0j will lies between
α1,0j = d˜0j{1 + (3σd˜20j/α2Ss,0)}−1/2 and α2,0j = d˜0j{1 − (3σd˜20j/α2Ss,0)}−1/2.
Now from equation 2, it is easy to check that α1,0j ≤ dˆ0j ≤ α2,0j ⇔ α∗1,0j =
α2Ss0 [1/α
2
2,0j − 1/dˆ20j] ≤ ε0j ≤ α∗2,0j = α2Ss0 [1/α21,0j − 1/dˆ20j]. Let pf0j be the
probability that the malicious node, which is originally located at x0, is accepted
by the j-th genuine node when it reports xf as its location. Now, from the above
discussion, it is quite clear that pf0j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n0) is given by
pf0j = P
[
dˆ0j ∈ (α1,0j , α2,0j)
]
=
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ α∗
2,0j
α∗
1,0j
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
dx (3)
Naturally, the malicious node tries to cheat as many genuine nodes as possi-
ble. Let us define an indicator variable Zf0j that takes the value 1 (or 0) if the
malicious nodes successfully cheats (or fails to cheat) the j-th genuine node
when it sends the faked location xf . Clearly, here E(Z
f
0j) = P (Z
f
0j = 1) = p
f
0j .
So, given the coordinates of the genuine nodes X0 = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn0}, θf,X00,n0 =
E(
∑n0
j=1 Z
f
0j) =
∑n0
j=1 p
f
0j denotes the expected number of genuine nodes to be
deceived by the malicious node if it pretends xf as its location. Naturally, the
malicious tries to find a faked position xf that maximizes θ
f,X0
0,n0
. Let us define
θX00,n0 = supxf∈F0 θ
f,X
0,n0
, where F0 is the set of all possible faking coordinates. A
malicious node located at x0 always looks for xf ∈ F0 such that θf,X00,n0 = θX00,n0 .
Here one should note that the region F0 depends on the true location of
the malicious node x0, and it is not supposed to contain any point lying in a
small neighborhood x0. Because in that case, x0 and xf will be almost the same,
and the malicious node will behave almost like a genuine node. Naturally, the
malicious node would not like to do that, and it will keep the neighborhood
outside F0. The size of this neighborhood of course depends on the specific
application, and the value of θX00,n0 may also depend on that.
3.2 Optimal strategy for genuine sensor nodes
Let A0 as the total number of nodes in the WSN that accept the malicious
node located at x0 (as discussed in Section 3.1) as genuine. Since a malicious
node is always accepted by other malicious nodes, if there are n0 genuine nodes
in the WSN and X0 denotes their co-ordinates, for the optimum choice of the
faking coordinates xf , the (conditional) expected value of A0 is given by E(A0 |
n0,X0) = (n−n0)+θX00,n0 . Now, a genuine node does not know a priori how many
genuine nodes are there is the WSN, and where they are located. So, at first, for
a given n0, it computes the average of E(A0 | n0,X0) over all possible X0. If D
denotes the deployment region (preferably a convex region) for the sensor nodes,
and if the nodes are assumed to be uniformly distributed over D, this average is
given by E(A0 | n0) =
∫
X0∈Dn0
E(A0 | n0,X0)ψ(X0)dX0, where ψ is the uniform
density function on Dn0 . Here we have chosen ψ to be uniform because it is the
most simplest one to deal with, and it is also the most common choice in the
absence of any prior knowledge on the distribution of nodes in D. When we have
some prior knowledge about this distribution, ψ can be chosen accordingly. Now,
define θ0,n0 =
∫
X0∈Dn0
θX00,n0ψ(X0)dX0. Clearly, E(A0 | n0) = (n − n0) + θ0,n0
depends on n0, which is unknown to the genuine node. So, it finds an upper bound
for E(A0 | n0) assuming that at least half of the sensor nodes in the WSN are
genuine. Under this assumption, this upper bound is given by ⌊0.5n⌋+ θ0,⌈0.5n⌉.
Theorem 1. If there are n nodes in a WSN, and at least half of them are
genuine, the expected number of acceptance for a malicious node located at x0 =
(x0, y0) cannot exceed ⌊0.5n⌋+ θ0,⌈0.5n⌉.
Proof. Suppose there are n0 genuine nodes (and n1 = n−n0 malicious nodes) in
the WSN, where n0 > ⌈n/2⌉. Define X0 = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn0} and X ={x1,x2, . . . ,
x⌈n/2⌉} ⊂ X0. Now, for given X0, the expected number of acceptance for the
malicious node located at x0 is E(A0 | n0,X0) = supf∈F0
(∑n0
i=1 p
f
0i
)
+ (n −
n0) ≤ supf∈F0
(∑⌈n/2⌉
i=1 p
f
0i
)
+ supf∈F0
(∑n0
i=⌈n/2⌉+1 p
f
0i
)
+ (n − n0) ≤ E(A0 |
⌈n/2⌉,X ) + (n0 − ⌈n/2⌉) + (n − n0) = θX0,⌈n/2⌉ + (n − ⌈n/2⌉). Now, taking
expectation w.r.t. X0, we get E(A0 | n0) ≤ θ0,⌈0.5n⌉ + ⌊n/2⌋. ⊓⊔
Note that θ0,⌈0.5n⌉ and the upper bound depend on the location of the
malicious node x0, So, for a genuine node, it is an unknown random quan-
tity. Therefore, a genuine node takes a conservative approach and computes
θ∗⌈n/2⌉ =
⌈
sup
x0∈D θ0,⌈n/2⌉
⌉
. Note that here, θ∗⌈n/2⌉ gives an upper bound of the
expected number of genuine nodes to be deceived by a malicious node in D
when there are ⌈n/2⌉ genuine sensor nodes in the WSN. To filter out all mali-
cious nodes from the WSN, a genuine node follows the idea of [6]. For any node,
it calculates the total number of acceptances (approvals) (A) and rejections (ac-
cusations) (R), and considers the node as malicious if R exceeds A−θ∗⌈n/2⌉. Since
A+R = n, a node is considered to be genuine if A ≥ (n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2. Note that if
there are n0 genuine nodes and n1 malicious nodes in the WSN, a malicious node,
on an average, can be accepted by at most θ∗n0 +n1 nodes, and it will be rejected
by at least n0 − θ∗n0 nodes. So, for a malicious node A− R − θ∗⌈n/2⌉ is expected
to be smaller than (n1 + 2θ
∗
n0)− n0 − θ∗⌈n/2⌉ ≤ ⌊n/2⌋+ θ∗n0 − n0 (from Theorem
1). Therefore, if we have n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ θ∗n0 , all malicious nodes are expected to
be filtered out from the WSN. A more detailed mathematical analysis of our
protocol will be given in Section 5. For computing θ∗⌈n/2⌉, a genuine node uses
the statistical simulation technique [3] assuming that the sensors are distributed
over D with density ψ (which is taken to be uniform in this article). First it
generates coordinates x0 for the malicious node and X for ⌈n/2⌉ genuine nodes
in D to compute θX0,⌈n/2⌉ by maximizing θf,X0,⌈n/2⌉. Repeating this over several X
one gets θ0,⌈n/2⌉ as an average of the θ
X
0,⌈n/2⌉s. This whole procedure is repeated
for several random choices of x0 to compute θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉ =
⌈
sup
x0∈D θ0,⌈n/2⌉
⌉
. Note
that this is an offline calculation, and it has to be done once only.
4 The Protocol
Based on above discussions, we develop the SecureNeighborDiscovery pro-
tocol. It is a two-phase approach to filter out malicious nodes. The first phase is
named as AccuseApprove, and the second phase is named as Filtering.
In the first phase, each sensor node reports its coordinates to all other
nodes by transmitting an initial message. Next, for each pair of nodes i and
j, node j computes two estimates of the distance dij , one using the RSS tech-
nique (dˆij) and the other from the reported coordinates (d˜ij), as mentioned
earlier. If dˆij /∈ (α1,ij , α2,ij) then node j accuses node i for its faking po-
sition. Otherwise, node j approves the location of node i as genuine. Here
α1,ij = d˜ij{1 + (3σd˜2ij/α2Ss,i)}−
1
2 and α2,ij = d˜ij{1 − (3σd˜2ij/α2Ss,i)}−
1
2 are
analogs of α1,0j and α2,0j defined in Section 3.1. To keep track of these accu-
sations and approvals, each node j maintains an array accusj , and transmits it
to all other nodes at the end of this phase. So, in the first phase, each node j
executes the AccuseApprove protocol which is given below.
Protocol: AccuseApprove (executed by node j)
1. j exchanges coordinates by transmitting initj & receiving n− 1 initi.
2. for each received message initi:
3. compute dˆij using the ranging (RSS) technique and
d˜ij using the reported coordinates of i.
4. if
[
dˆij /∈ (α1,ij , α2,ij)
]
then accusj [i]← true
else accusj [i]← false
5. j exchanges accusations by transmitting accusj & receiving n− 1 accusi.
Protocol: Filtering (executed by node j)
1. F = φ, G = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n
′
← n
2. repeat{k ← n
′
3. for each received accusi: (i ∈ G)
4. for each r : (r ∈ G)
5. if accusi[r] = true then NumAccusr+ = 1
else NumApprover+ = 1
6. newF = φ.
7. for each sensor i : (i ∈ G)
8. if (NumApprovei ≥ (k + θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉)/2) then
j considers i as a genuine node.
else j considers i as a malicious node.
filter out i, newF = newF ∪ {i}, n
′
← n
′
− 1.
9. F = F ∪ newF , G = G \ newF .
10. for each sensor i : (i ∈ newF )
11. discard accusi & corresponding i
th entry of accusr for all r ∈ G
12. } until(k 6= n
′
)
In the second phase, each node j executes the Filtering protocol, where
it counts the number of accusations and approvals toward node i including its
own message. Node j finds node i as malicious if the number of accusations
exceeds the number of approvals minus θ∗⌈n/2⌉. Conversely, node i is considered
as genuine if its number of approvals is greater than or equal to (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2.
In this process, nodes that are detected as malicious nodes, are filtered out from
the WSN. Next, it ignores the decisions given by these deleted nodes and repeats
the same filtering method with the remaining ones. If there are n
′
nodes in the
WSN, a node is considered to be malicious if the number of approvals is smaller
than (n
′
+θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2. Instead of θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉, we can use θ
∗
⌈n′/2⌉
, but in that case, θ∗
⌈n′/2⌉
needs to be computed again, and it needs to be computed online. Therefore, to
reduce the computing cost of our algorithm, here we stick to θ∗⌈n/2⌉. Note that
the use of θ∗⌈n/2⌉ also makes the filtering protocol more strict in the sense that it
increases the probability of a node being filtered out. Node j repeats this method
until there are no further deletions of nodes from the WSN.
The Filtering protocol is given above. Here F and G denote the set of
malicious and genuine nodes respectively. Initially, we set F = φ and G =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. At each stage, we detect some malicious nodes and filter them out.
Those nodes are deleted from G and included in F . At the end of the algorithm,
G gives the set of nodes remaining in WSN, which are considered to be genuine
nodes. It would be ideal if the set of coordinates of the nodes in G matches with
X . However, it might not always be possible. The main objective of our protocol
is to filter out all malicious nodes from the WSN. In the process, a few genuine
nodes may also get removed. So, if not all, at the end of the algorithm, one would
like G to contain most of the genuine nodes and no malicious nodes.
5 Correctness of the protocol
To check the correctness of the above protocol, we consider the worst case sce-
nario as mentioned before, where all genuine nodes get accused by all malicious
nodes, and each malicious node gets approved by all other malicious nodes. As-
sume that there are n0 genuine nodes and n1 malicious nodes in the WSN. Now,
for j, j
′
= 1, 2, . . . , n0, define the indicator variable Z
∗
jj′
= 1 if the j
′
-th genuine
node accepts the j-th genuine node, and 0 otherwise. So, for the j-th genuine
node, the number of approvals A∗j can be expressed as A
∗
j = 1+
∑n0
j′=1,j′ 6=j
Z∗
jj′
,
where the Z∗
jj′
s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as Bernoulli
random variables with the success probability p = P (Z∗
jj′
= 1) = 0.9973 ≃ 1. If
n0 is reasonably large, using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [8] for the i.i.d.
case, one can show that (see Theorem 2) P (A∗j ≥ (n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) ≃ 1 − Φ (τ),
where Φ = cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and τ =
n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉−2n0p
2
√
p(1−p)(n0−1)
. Since this probability does not depend on j, the same
expression holds for all genuine nodes.
Theorem 2. Assume that there are n nodes in the WSN, and n0 of them are
genuine. If n0 is sufficiently large, for the j-th genuine node (j = 1, 2, . . . , n0), we
have the acceptance probability P
(
A∗j ≥
n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉
2
)
≃ 1− Φ
(
n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉−2n0p
2
√
p(1−p)(n0−1)
)
.
Proof. Since all malicious nodes are assumed to be intelligent, none of them
will accept the genuine node. One should also notice that the j-th genuine
node will always accept itself. So, for this node, it is easy to see that A∗j −
1 =
∑n0
j′=1,j′ 6=j
Z∗jj′ is the sum of (n0 − 1) independent Bernoulli random vari-
ables, each of which takes the values 1 and 0 with probability p = 0.9973
and 1 − p = 0.0027, respectively. From the Central Limit Theorem (C.L.T.)
for i.i.d. random variables [8], we have
√
n0 − 1
(
A∗j
n0−1
− p
)
∼ N (0, p(1− p)).
Therefore, the acceptance probability of the j-th node is P
(
A∗j ≥
n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉
2
)
=
P
(
A∗j−1
n0−1
≥ n+θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉−2
2(n0−1)
)
≃ 1−Φ
(
n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉−2−2(n0−1)p√
2(n0−1)p(1−p)
)
≃ 1−Φ
(
n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉−2n0p
2
√
p(1−p)(n0−1)
)
.
⊓⊔
If n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉ − 2n0p < 0 (equivalent to n0 > (n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2 since p ≃ 1),
for any genuine node j (j = 1, 2, . . . , n0), the acceptance probability P (A
∗
j ≥
(n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) is bigger than 1/2. Again, if p is close to 1 (which is the case
here), the denominator of τ becomes close to zero. So, in that case, the acceptance
probability P (A∗j ≥ (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) turns out to be very close to 1. Note that if
we have n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ θ∗n0 , the condition n0 > (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2 gets satisfied.
Now, given the coordinates of n0 genuine sensor nodes X0, the malicious
node, which is actually located at x0 but sends xf as its faked location, has the
number of acceptance A0 = n1+
∑n0
j=1 Z
f
0j , where n1 is the number of malicious
nodes in the WSN, and Zf0j ∼ B(1, pf0j) for j = 1, 2, . . . , n0 (see Section 3.1).
Again from the discussion in Section 3.2, it follows that E(A0) < n1+ θ
∗
n0 . So, if
n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+θ∗n0, using Theorem 1, it is easy to check that (n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉−E(A0)) >
0.5(n0−⌊n/2⌋−θ∗n0) ≥ 0, and it is expected to increase with n linearly. So, if the
standard deviation of A0 (square root of the variance V ar(A0)) remains bounded
as a function of n, or it diverges at a slower rate (which is usually the case), for
sufficiently large number of nodes in the WSN, the final acceptance probability
of the malicious node P (A0 ≥ (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) becomes very close to zero.
Theorem 3. If we have sufficiently large number of nodes in the wireless sensor
network and n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋ + θ∗n0 , for any malicious node, the final acceptance
probability P (A0 ≥ (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) ≃ 0.
Proof. Define Y as the number of genuine nodes in the WSN that accept the
malicious node as genuine. First note that A0 = n1+Y , and Y can be expressed
as Y =
∑n0
i=1 Yi, where the Yis are independent, and Yi ∼ Ber(pi), for the pis
being the probabilities of acceptance by genuine nodes in WSN for the best choice
of the faking position. Clearly, E(Y ) ≤ θ∗n0 , σ2n0 = V ar(Y ) =
∑n0
i=1 pi(1−pi) and
ρ3n0 =
∑n0
i=1 E|Yi − E(Yi)|3 < σ2n0 . Now, under the condition n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ θ∗n0 ,
it is easy to check that E(A0) < (n + θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉)/2, and (n + θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉)/2 − E(A0)
increases with n linearly. So, if σ2n0 = V ar(Y ) = V ar(A0) remains bounded
as a function of n, using Chebychev’s inequality or otherwise, one can show
that limn→∞ P (A0 ≥ (n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) = 0. But the most likely case is σ2n0 →
∞ as n → ∞. In this case, one can verify that ρn0/σn0 → 0 as n → ∞ (or
equivalently n0 → ∞). Therefore, from Liapunov’s Central Limit Theorem [8],
we have [A0 − E(A0)]/
√
V ar(A0) ∼ N(0, 1) and P (A0 ≥ (n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) ≃
1−Φ
(
(n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2−E(A0)√
V ar(A0)
)
. Now, (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2−E(A0) grows with n linearly,
but
√
V ar(A0) ≤ √n0/2 grows at a slower rate. So, P (A0 ≥ (n+θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2)→ 0
as n → ∞, and for large n, P (A0 ≥ (n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2) ≃ 0. Since the result does
not depend on the location of the malicious node x0, it holds for all malicious
nodes present in the WSN. ⊓⊔
Theorems 2 and 3 suggest that if n is sufficiently large and n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+θ∗n0,
all genuine nodes in the WSN have acceptance probabilities close to 1, and all
malicious nodes have acceptance probabilities close to 0. So, it is expected that
after the first round of filtering, if not all, a large number of genuine nodes will be
accepted. On the contrary, if not all, almost all malicious nodes will get filtered
out from the network. However, for proper functioning of the WSN, one needs
to remove all malicious nodes. In order to do that, we repeat the Filtering
procedure again with the remaining nodes. Now, among these remaining nodes,
all but a few are expected to be genuine, and because of this higher proportion
of genuine nodes, the acceptance probability of the genuine nodes are expected
to increase, and those for the malicious nodes nodes are expected to decrease
further. So, if this procedure is used repeatedly, after some stage, WSN is ex-
pected to contain genuine nodes only, and no nodes will be filtered out after that.
When this is the case, our Filtering algorithm stops. Note that this algorithm
does not need the values of n0 and n1 to be specified. We need to know n only
for computation of θ∗⌈n/2⌉. This is the only major computation involved in our
method, but one can understand that this is an off-line calculation. If we know
a priori the values of θ∗⌈n/2⌉ for different n, one can use those tabulated values
to avoid this computation. Note that the condition n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ θ∗n0 is only a
sufficient condition under which the proposed protocol functions properly. Later,
we will see that in the presence of negligible noise (or in the absence of noise) in
the WSN, this condition matches with that of [6], and in that case, it turns out
to be a necessary and sufficient condition. However, in other cases, it remains a
sufficient condition only, and our protocol may work properly even when it is not
satisfied. Our simulation studies in the next section will make this more clear.
6 Simulation results
We carried out simulation studies to evaluate the performance of our proposed
algorithm. In the first part of the simulation, we calculated the value of θ∗⌈n/2⌉
using the statistical simulation technique [3], and using that θ∗⌈n/2⌉, in the second
part, we filtered out all suspected malicious nodes from the WSN. While maxi-
mizing θf,X0,⌈n/2⌉ w.r.t. xf , in order to ensure that xf and x0 are not close, an open
ball around x0 is kept outside the search region F0. Unless mentioned otherwise,
we carried out our experiments with 100 sensors nodes, but for varying choice of
n0 and n1 and also for different levels of noise (i.e., different values of σ
2). For
choosing the value of σ2, first we considered two imaginary nodes (the sender
and the receiver nodes) located at two extreme corners of D and calculated the
received signal strength Srextreme for that set up under ideal condition (see Friis
equation 1). The error standard deviation σ was taken as smaller than or equal
to SS = Srextreme/3 to ensure that all received signal strengths remain positive
(after error contamination) with probability almost equal to 1.
6.1 WSN with insignificant noise (σ = 10−6SS)
In this case, we observe that the value of θX0,⌈n/2⌉ remains almost constant and
equal to 2p = 1.9946 ≃ 2 for varying choices of x0 and X . So, we have θ∗⌈n/2⌉ = 2.
In fact, in this case, θ∗k turns out to be 2 for all k ≥ 2. So, if we choose n0 = 52
and n1 = 48, the condition n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋ + θn0 gets satisfied, and one should
expect the protocol to work well. When we carried out experiment, each of the
48 malicious nodes could deceive exactly two genuine nodes, and as a result,
the number of approvals turned out to 50. So, all of them failed to reach the
threshold (n+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2 = 51, and they were filtered out from the WSN at the
very first round. On the contrary, all 52 genuine nodes had number of approvals
bigger than (47 out 52 nodes) or equal to (5 out of 52 nodes) 51, and none of
them were filtered out. So, at the beginning of the second round of filtering, we
had 52 nodes in the WSN, and all of them were genuine. Since the number of
approvals for each genuine node remained the same as it was in the first round,
it was well above the updated threshold (52+2)/2=27. So, no other nodes were
filtered out, and our algorithm stopped with all genuine nodes and no malicious
nodes in the network. Needless to mention that the proposed protocol led to the
same result for all higher values of n0. But it did not work properly when we took
n0 = 51 and n1 = 49. In that case, all malicious nodes had 51 approvals, and
those for the genuine nodes were smaller than or equal to 51. So, no malicious
nodes but some genuine nodes were deleted at the first round of filtering. As
a result, the number of approvals for the genuine nodes became smaller at the
second round, and that led to the removal of those nodes from the WSN. Note
that in this case, the condition n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ θn0 does not get satisfied. So, here
the condition is not only sufficient, but it turns out to be necessary as well.
We carried out our experiment also with 101 nodes. When there were 51
genuine and 50 malicious nodes in the WSN, the protocol did not work properly.
But in the case of n0 = 52 and n1 = 49, it could filter out all malicious nodes.
In that case, each malicious node had 51 approvals, smaller than the threshold
(n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2 = 51.5. But, 48 out of 52 genuine nodes were accepted by all 52
genuine nodes. So, at the end of first round of filtering, in the WSN, we had 48
genuine nodes only. Naturally, no other nodes were removed at the second round.
Again this shows that n0 ≥ ⌊n/2⌋+ θn0 is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the protocol to work when the noise is negligible. This is consistent with the
findings of [6], where the authors allowed no noise in the network.
6.2 WSN with significant noise (σ = SS)
Unlike the previous case, here θX0,⌈n/2⌉ did not remain constant for different
choices of x0 and X . Considering n = 100, we computed θX0,⌈n/2⌉ over 500 simu-
lations, and they ranged between 5.9831 and 23.6964 leading to θ∗⌈n/2⌉ = 24 and
(n + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2 = 62. Clearly, if we start with less than 62 genuine nodes, the
protocol fails as all genuine nodes get deleted at the first round of filtering. So,
we started with 62 genuine and 38 malicious nodes. One can notice that here
n0 < ⌈n/2⌉+ θ∗⌈n/2⌉, and the condition n0 ≥ ⌈n/2⌉+ θ∗n0 does not get satisfied.
But our protocol worked nicely and filtered out all malicious nodes from the
WSN. This shows that the above condition is only sufficient in this case. At the
first round of filtering, 54 out of the 62 genuine nodes, and 5 out of 38 malicious
nodes could reach the threshold. So, at the beginning of the second round, we
had only 59 nodes in the network leading to a threshold of (59+24)/2=41.5.
Naturally, none of the malicious nodes and all the genuine nodes could cross this
threshold, and at the end of the second round of filtering, we had only 54 nodes
in the WSN, all of which were genuine. As expected, no nodes were filtered out
at the third round, and our algorithm terminated with 54 genuine nodes.
6.3 A modified filtering algorithm based on quantiles
Note that in the previous problem, if we start with 60 genuine nodes and 40
malicious nodes, the protocol fails as all genuine nodes get deleted at the first
round of filtering. Here we propose a slightly modified version of our protocol that
works even when n0 is smaller than (n+θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉)/2. Instead of using (n+θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉)/2,
we use a sequence of thresholds based on different quantiles of θX0,⌈n/2⌉. At first,
we begin with the threshold n/2 (i.e. replace θ∗⌈n/2⌉ by 0) and follow the protocol
described in Section 4. In the process, some nodes may get filtered out. If there
are n(1) nodes remaining in the WSN, we use the threshold (n(1)+θ0.1⌈n/2⌉)/2 (i.e.
replace θ∗⌈n/2⌉ by θ
0.1
⌈n/2⌉) and apply the filtering phase of the protocol Filtering
on the remaining nodes. Here θq⌈n/2⌉ denotes the q-th (0 < q < 1) quantile
of θX0,⌈n/2⌉, and this can be estimated from the 500 values of θ
X
0,n/2 observed
during simulation. This procedure is repeated with thresholds (n(i) + θ
i/10
⌈n/2⌉)/2
for i = 2, 3, . . . , 9, and finally we use the threshold (n(10) + θ∗⌈n/2⌉)/2. The nodes
remaining in the WSN after these 11 steps of filtering are considered as genuine
nodes. This algorithm worked well in our case, and it filtered out all malicious
nodes from the WSN without losing a single genuine node. In fact, all malicious
nodes were filtered out after the first two steps, and there were no deletions of
nodes after that. The results for the first two steps are shown in Table 1 (in our
case, θ0.1⌈n/2⌉ was 8.6786). The total number of approvals for the deleted nodes
are also reported in the table for better understanding of the algorithm.
This modified version could filter out up to 44 malicious nodes. In the case of
n0 = 56 and n1 = 44, only one genuine node was deleted from the WSN before
all malicious nodes were filtered out. However, in the case of n0 = 55, n1 = 45
our algorithm failed. In that case, all genuine nodes had 54 or 55 approvals, but
almost all malicious nodes had more than 55 approvals. So, our protocol could
remove only 9 malicious nodes before all genuine were filtered out.
7 Possible improvements
In this article, we have used the modified version of Friis transmission equation
2 for developing our SecureNeighborDiscovery protocol. However, some-
times one needs empirical adjustments to the basic Friis equation 1 using larger
Table 1. First two steps of filtering (based on quantiles) with n0 = 60 and n1 = 40.
Step(i) Total nodes (n(i)) Threshold Nodes deleted No. of approvals
Genuine Malicious Genuine Malicious for deleted nodes
0 60 40 50.00 0 1 < 50
60 39 49.50 0 0 —
1 60 39 53.84 0 3 51-54
60 36 52.34 0 5 55-56
60 31 49.84 0 5 57-58
60 26 47.34 0 17 59-61
60 9 38.84 0 9 62-69
60 0 34.34 0 0 —
exponents. These are used in terrestrial models, where reflected signals can
lead to destructive interference, and foliage and atmospheric gases contribute
to signal attenuation [9]. There one can consider Srji/S
s
i to be proportional to
GrGs(λ/dij)
m, where Gr and Gs are mean effective gain of the antennas and
m is a scaler typically lies in the range [2, 4]. If m is known, one can develop
a verification scheme following the method described in this article. Even if it
is not known, it can be estimated by sending signals from known distances and
measuring the received signal strengths.
However, our proposed protocol is not above all limitations. In this article, we
have assumed that the underlying network topology is a complete graph. But,
in practice, this may not always be the case. In multi-hop network topology,
our SecureNeighborDiscovery protocol based on voting can be used in the
neighborhood of each node, provided there are sufficiently many genuine nodes
in the neighborhood. However, the performance of this verification protocol in
the case of multi-hop network topology needs to be thoroughly investigated.
8 Concluding remarks
In this article, we have proposed a distributed secure position verification proto-
col for WSNs in noisy channels. In this approach, without relying on any trusted
sensor nodes, all genuine nodes detect the existence of malicious nodes and filter
them out with a very high probability. The proposed method is conceptually
quite simple, and it is easy to implement if θ∗⌈n/2⌉ is known. Calculation of θ
∗
⌈n/2⌉
is the only major computation involved in our method, but one should note that
this is an off-line calculation.
In the case of negligible noise in the WSN, we have seen that the perfor-
mance of our protocol matches with that of the deterministic methods of [6].
However, when the noise is not negligible, each of the sensor nodes can only
have a limited precision for distance estimation. In such cases, it is not possi-
ble to develop a deterministic algorithm [6]. Our protocol based on probabilistic
algorithm takes care of this problem, and it filters out all malicious nodes with
very high probability. When the number of nodes in the WSN is reasonable large,
this probability turns out to be very close to 1. So, for all practical purposes, our
proposed method behaves almost like a deterministic algorithm as we have seen
in Section 6. Since the influence of noise on signal propagation is very common
in WSNs, this probabilistic approach is very practical for the implementation
perspective in the real world.
One should also notice that compared to the randomized protocol of Hwang
et al. [14], our protocol leads to substantial savings on the time and the power
used for transmissions. In [14], the message complexity is O(n2), since each sensor
announces one distance at a time in a round robin fashion. But, in the case of
our proposed protocol, O(n) messages are transmitted in the first phase, and
each sensor announces all distances through a single message.
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